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This paper examines the effects of children on consumption and wealth. To anchor 
intuition, we develop implications using a simple permanent income model with no 
uncertainty and complete markets. But this framework does not come close to matching 
the distribution of existing wealth. We therefore examine the effects of children using a 
rich, augmented life-cycle model, and using a life-cycle model with endogenous fertility.  
We find that children have a large effect on household’s net worth and consequently are 
an important factor in understanding the wealth distribution. The effects of children are 
much larger than the effects of asset tests associated with cash and near-cash transfers, 
given earnings realizations and the social security system experienced by households in 
the original HRS cohort. We also show that fertility and credit constraints interact in 
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  The distribution of retirement wealth is much more dispersed than earnings. Using data from 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and social security earnings records, the ratio of real 
lifetime earnings for the household at the 90
th percentile of the lifetime earnings distribution 
relative to the earnings of the household at the 10
th percentile (referred to as the 90-10 ratio) is 
22.5.  The 90-10 ratio for 1992 household net worth (including housing wealth) is 525.  The 
coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) of lifetime income is 0.76.  
The coefficient of variation of net worth is 2.01.  Explaining the dispersion in wealth has been a 
longstanding challenge. A simple-minded framework that assumes earnings differences solely 
explain wealth differences across the rich and the poor is too simplistic.
1   
  There is a large literature on life-cycle wealth accumulation.  But surprisingly few studies 
examine the effects of children on consumption and wealth.
2  Children might be expected to 
affect wealth accumulation for at least three reasons.  First, family size is correlated with lifetime 
earnings, so optimal asset accumulation will be correlated with children if wealth accumulation 
varies with a household’s place in the income distribution.
3  Second, the number of children (and 
adults) in the household affects the utility of a given amount of (private) consumption, which in 
turn affects optimal consumption decisions.  Third, with uncertain earnings (and uncertainty in 
health and lifespan), the timing of fertility can affect optimal consumption decisions.   
  This paper focuses on the effects that children have on life-cycle wealth accumulation.  We 
start with a simple permanent income model with no uncertainty and complete markets to build 
intuition about the effects of children.  But this framework does not come close to matching the 
                                                 
1 A recent study documenting this fact is Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004). 
2 Browning (1992) is a notable exception, as is Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Browning and Ejrnæs (2002).  
We briefly discuss the latter two papers later. 
3 A common feature of many important papers on life-cycle wealth accumulation is to ask, given an earnings 
distribution, what is the implied distribution of wealth (see, for example, Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Deaton,  
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distribution of existing wealth.  So we then look at the effects of children in the augmented life-
cycle model discussed in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006).  But both approaches take 
the arrival and timing of children as being exogenous:  because fertility may be affected by 
wealth and earnings expectations, we also describe results from a model that incorporates 
endogenous fertility in the spirit of Barro and Becker (1988).  Our conclusions about the 
importance of children in understanding wealth accumulation are consistent across modeling 
approaches. 
  We find that children have a large effect on household’s net worth and consequently are an 
important factor in understanding the wealth distribution.  We show, for example, that the effects 
of children are much larger than the effects of asset tests associated with cash and near-cash 
transfers, given earnings realizations and the social security system experienced by households in 
the HRS.  This result is striking, given a conclusion of Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) who 
write: 
“…the presence of asset-based means testing of welfare program can imply that a 
significant fraction of the group with lower lifetime income will not accumulate wealth.  
The reason is that saving and wealth are subject to an implicit tax rate of 100 percent in 
the event of an earnings downturn or medical expense large enough to cause the 
household to seek welfare support.  This effect is much weaker for those with higher 
lifetime income…” (p. 393).   
 
  We also show that credit constraints are quantitatively important, and fertility and credit 
constraints interact in ways that significantly affect wealth accumulation.  In particular, poorer 
households with more children are typically credit constrained for a longer time than their richer 
counterparts.  Absent the systematic variation in family size with respect to income, the model 
implies that richer households would be credit constrained for longer time since they have 
                                                                                                                                                             
1991; Aiyagari, 1991; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; as well as more recent work, such as De Nardi, 2004 ).    3
steeper age-earnings profiles than poorer households.  The wide dispersion in wealth holdings 
arises, in part, from the interaction between the earnings and fertility distributions in a world 
with uninsurable risks and borrowing constraints. 
  In the next section we describe our data and present descriptive statistics from the HRS 
about the number of children across income deciles, the timing of fertility across families, and 
the age-earnings profiles of households with different numbers of children.  Section 2 briefly 
discusses children in a life-cycle model with no uncertainty.  Since most expenses on children 
are borne by parents prior to retirement, families with children would be expected to have lower 
retirement wealth, all else being equal, than families without.  But the life-cycle model with no 
uncertainty does not reflect the importance of precautionary saving and credit constraints on 
wealth accumulation.  In sections 3 and 4 we present two additional models that more closely 
match features of the economy, we describe our policy experiments, and we present our results.  
Section 5 briefly discusses descriptive, reduced form regressions from the HRS motivated by our 
analytic work.  The paper concludes with a discussion of other related considerations. 
I.  Facts about Children and Wealth for Households in the Health and Retirement Study 
  The HRS is a national panel study with an initial sample (in 1992) of 12,652 persons in 
7,702 households.  It oversamples blacks, Hispanics, and residents of Florida.  The baseline 1992 
study consisted of in-home, face-to-face interviews of the 1931-1941 birth cohort and their 
spouses, if they are married.  Follow-up interviews were given by telephone in 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, and 2004.  For the analyses in this paper we exclude 379 married households where 
one spouse did not participate in the 1992 HRS, 93 households that failed to have at least one 
                                                                                                                                                             
Our paper also takes the earnings distribution as being exogenous.  
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year of full-time work, and 908 households where the highest earner began working full time 
prior to 1951.
4  Our resulting sample has 10,523 respondents in 6,322 households. 
  The survey covers a wide range of topics, including batteries of questions on health and 
cognitive conditions; retirement plans; subjective assessments of mortality probabilities and the 
quality of retirement preparation; family structure; employment status and job history; 
demographic characteristics; housing; income and net worth; and pension details.  
I.1. Children in the HRS 
  There are strong correlations in the HRS between children, factors that likely influence 
wealth accumulation, and wealth itself.  In Table 1 we summarize some characteristics of the 
HRS population by the number of children they have.  Column 1 shows the modal number of 
children for the sample is two, but 31.8 percent of families have three or four children.  Not 
surprisingly, as the number of children increases, the mean age of the primary earner when the 
last child is born increases.  And the later fertility is completed, the smaller is the share of 
lifetime earnings received after the last child is born.  As we discuss later, a substantial fraction 
of HRS households are credit constrained early in life.  Since children increase household 
consumption requirements, the presence of children in the household and the timing of births 
may affect the length of the credit constrained period. 
  The final three columns of Table 1 highlight patterns of net worth and lifetime income by 
the number of children in households.
5  We summarize the relationship in Figure 1.  For each 
                                                 
4 We drop the first group because we do not have information on spousal, and hence household, income.  We drop 
the second group because we do not have information on transfer payments in years prior to the HRS survey and 
therefore we cannot model the lifetime budget constraint.  We drop households where the highest earner started 
working before 1951 for computational reasons.  Our procedures to impute missing and top-coded data are more 
complicated when initial values of the earnings process are missing.   
5 Net worth (private savings) is a comprehensive measure that includes housing assets less liabilities, business assets 
less liabilities, checking and saving accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, retirement accounts including defined   5
household we calculate the ratio of net worth (in 1992) to real (undiscounted) lifetime earnings 
and plot the median of these values for families, tabulated by the number of children they have.
6   
The ratio of net worth (in 1992) to lifetime income is highest for families with two children.  It 
falls monotonically with the number of children above 2.  If we simply calculate the percentage 
of mean net worth given in the second-to-last column of Table 1 to lifetime earnings (the last 
column), it is larger (20.6 percent) for families with no children than it is for families with any 
positive number of children.  For families with children the net-worth-to-lifetime-earnings 
percentage has a concave shape, starting at 16.5 percent for one-child families, peaking at 18.0 
for three-child families, and falling to 13.3 percent for families with seven or more children.  
These figures provide suggestive evidence that net worth is not fully determined by lifetime 
earnings and children may have some effect on the dispersion of wealth. 
  Table 2 shows information similar to that presented in Table 1, but organized by lifetime 
earnings deciles and marital status.  The first two columns show median and mean net worth, the 
variable of central interest to this paper.  It is clear that the distribution of net worth is skewed 
rightward, as the means substantially exceed the medians.  The mean number of children among 
married couples falls from 4.6 in the lowest lifetime income decile to 3.1 in the highest.  Similar 
patterns hold for single households (in 1992).
7  There is little systematic relationship between the 
age of completed fertility and lifetime income, despite the fact that the number of children is 
                                                                                                                                                             
contribution pensions, certificates of deposit, the cash value of whole life insurance, and other assets, less credit card 
debt and other liabilities.  It excludes defined benefit pension wealth, social security wealth, and future earnings.  
The concept of wealth is similar (and in many cases identical) to those used in other studies of wealth and saving 
adequacy. 
6 In brief, our use of restricted access social security earnings records allows us to construct an unusually accurate 
measure of real lifetime earnings.  We account for top-coding of social security earnings records, missing 
observations, and future earnings (making use of past earnings and individuals’ expected retirement dates).  
Appendix 1 provides a bit more detail and the on-line appendix of Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) 
provides complete details of our approach. 
7 Single and married households are categorized based on their status in 1992.   
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negatively correlated with lifetime income.  This suggests that higher income HRS households 
may be delaying fertility relative to others.  Lastly, there is a positive correlation between 
lifetime income and the fraction of lifetime earnings received after the last child was born.  
Given there is little systematic pattern in the ages at which the last child was born, this suggests 
that households with high lifetime incomes have more steeply shaped age-earnings profiles.   
  Figure 2 plots age-earnings profiles by family size for HRS households.
8  There appears to 
be a small amount of spreading of the earnings trajectories, but in general, the slopes of the 
profiles look similar.  Childless individuals and/or couples clearly have the lowest incomes over 
their lifetimes.  Households with 2 and 3 children have the highest and most steeply sloped age-
earnings profiles.  The profiles flatten and are lower as the number of children increases beyond 
3. 
  The descriptive data are consistent with at least three channels through which children may 
influence wealth.  First, as is clear from Figure 2, family size is correlated with lifetime 
earnings.
9  Second, the number of children varies inversely with lifetime income.  If children are 
costly, this alone will lead to wealth differences (as a fraction of lifetime income) between high- 
and low-lifetime income households.  Third, those with more children have children later in life 
so children are present in the household for a larger portion of adults’ working years.  Below, we 
systematically explore the implications of these facts in the context of the life-cycle model.   
  Appendix Table 1 provides means, standard deviations, and in some cases, medians for 
other variables important to this study.  The mean (median) present discounted value of lifetime 
                                                 
8 Specifically, we plot a median log earnings using Stata’s “graph twoway mbands” command. 
9 The same qualitative patterns hold for versions of Figure 2 that are restricted to married couples, to single 
households, or to households who have never changed marital status (or partners) given their 1992 status.   7
household earnings is $1,718,932 ($1,541,555).
10 Retirement consumption will be financed out 
of defined benefit pension wealth (mean is $106,041, median is $17,327);
11 social security 
wealth (mean is $107,577, median is $97,726);
12 and nonpension net worth (mean is $225,928, 
median is $102,600). The mean age of the household head is 55.7.
13 
II. Children and Wealth in a Life-Cycle Model with no Uncertainty 
  We briefly start providing intuition about the effect of children on household wealth using a 
simple Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) permanent income model, allowing family size to vary 
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where  j c denotes consumption,  j y  stands for earnings, β  is the pure rate of time preference 
(generally thought to be less than one), r  is the real interest rate, and  j N adjusts the utility value 
                                                 
10When calculating present discounted values of earnings and social security wealth, we discount the constant-dollar 
sum of earnings (social security, or pensions) by a real interest rate measure (prior to 1992, we use the difference 
between the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the year-to-year change in the CPI-W; for 1992 and after we use 4 
percent). For the defined benefit pension wealth, we assume that the real interest rate is 2.21%, consistent with the 
6.3 percent interest rates and 4 percent inflation assumed under the intermediate scenarios of the Pension Present 
Value Database. 
11 The value of defined benefit pensions are calculated using the HRS  “Pension Present Value Database” at 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/data/avail.html. The programs use detailed plan descriptions along with information 
on employee earnings.  We use self-reported defined-benefit pension information for households not included in the 
database.  The assumptions used in the program to calculate the value of defined contribution (DC) pensions – 
particularly the assumption that contributions were a constant fraction of income during years worked with a given 
employer – are likely inappropriate.  Consequently, we follow others in the literature (for example, Engen et al., 
1999, p. 159) and use self-reported information to calculate DC pension wealth. 
    Defined benefit pension expectations are formed on the basis of an empirical pension function that depends in a 
nonlinear way on union status, years of service in the pension-covered job, and expectations about earnings in the 
last year of work. We estimate the function with HRS data.  Details are in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006). 
12 We use a social security calculator to compute benefits based on the social security earnings histories (and for 
those who refused to release earnings, imputed earnings).   
     Households in the model expect the social security rules in 1992 to prevail and develop expectations of social 
security benefits that are consistent with their earnings expectations. Details are in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 
(2006). 
13The head of household is defined throughout the paper as the person in the household with the largest share of 
lifetime earnings. When we refer to the age or retirement date of the household, we are referring to the age or 
retirement date of the household head.  
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of consumption for the number of children and adults in the household.
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.   
  The first term (enclosed in parentheses) adjusts period j consumption for the number of 
adults and children in the household. The second term (enclosed in parentheses) simply denotes 
discounted lifetime earnings.  When family size is large, the household consumes more, so, all 
else equal, a larger family size reduces the household’s resources available for retirement.
15  
Thus, in the life-cycle model with no uncertainty and perfect capital markets, larger families 
consume more of their income earlier in their life-cycle and hence consume less in retirement.  
Put differently, larger families would appear to be more impatient, consuming a greater share of 
                                                 
14 We multiply utility by Nj so the marginal utility of consumption is equal across families of different sizes. 
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lifetime resources when children are present relative to families with fewer children (all else 
being equal).    
  If there is systematic variation between family size and lifetime earnings, Euler equations 
estimated from the life-cycle model that fail to account for family size will overstate the 
variation in discount factors needed to rationalize household’s consumption choices. Indeed this 
is the basis for Lawrance (1991), who concludes that accounting for variation in family 
composition reduces the heterogeneity in discount factors estimated from a consumption Euler 
equation. Nevertheless, she finds that the remaining variation in discount factors is systematic – 
high earners are more patient. 
  Attanasio and Browning (1995) show that once one accounts for the variation in family size 
over the life-cycle, a flat age-consumption profile – consistent with the life-cycle model – 
obtains.  Browning and Ejrnæs (2002) argue that precautionary motives may not play an 
essential role in generating hump-shaped age-consumption profiles:  taking proper account of the 
ages and number of children may be sufficient. In the context of the simple framework described 
in the previous section, however, family size variation alone cannot explain the level and 
skewness of wealth.
16 Thus, we explore the interaction between precautionary motives and 
variation in family size to better understand the distribution of wealth. 
  The next section describes calculations from a life-cycle model with borrowing constraints 
and idiosyncratic shocks, where family size and the timing of births varies based on data from 
                                                 
16 For example, in the life-cycle model above (with 0.97, 3  and 0.03 r β γ = == ) and where households have their 
observed earnings realizations, married households in the bottom decile optimally choose to have zero assets when 
we observe them in the data (the average age is 56.5), while households in the top decile have $66,382. This is 
accounted for by two key factors.  First married households at the bottom decile have 4.6 kids while those in the top 
decile have 3.1 kids. Second, the ratio of resources available at retirement (social security wealth and defined benefit 
wealth) to lifetime earnings is about 25 percent for the bottom decile and only 10 percent for the top decile, thereby 
leading the richer households to want to transfer more resources towards retirement.   
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the HRS. We show how variation in the number and timing of children affect household wealth. 
As will become clear, a key mechanism is that since larger households have children attached 
with them for longer, on average, than their counterparts with fewer children, they will be 
borrowing constrained for a longer period of time. All else equal, this reduces the optimal wealth 
at retirement. Indeed, in what follows, we find the quantitative effect of this phenomenon is 
large. 
III. A Model of Optimal Wealth Accumulation 
  We solve a simple life-cycle model, augmented to incorporate uncertain lifetimes, 
uninsurable earnings, uninsurable medical expenses, and borrowing constraints. A household 
derives utility  () Uc from period-by-period consumption in equivalent units, where  (, ) j j gA K  is 
a function that adjusts consumption for the number of adults  j A  and children  j K  in the 
household at age j .
17  Let  j c  and  j a  represent consumption and assets at age j . With probability 
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future utilities isβ . Expected lifetime utility is then 
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The expectation operator E  denotes the expectation over future earnings uncertainty, uncertainty 
in health expenditures, and uncertainty over life span. 
                                                 
17We do not model marriage or divorce. Married households in 1992 are modeled as making their lifecycle 
consumption decisions jointly with their partner throughout their working lives. They become single only if a spouse 
dies. Similarly, single households in 1992 are modeled as making their lifecycle consumption decisions as if they 
were single throughout their working lives. They are assumed to remain single until death.    11
  Consumption and assets are chosen to maximize expected utility subject to the constraints,
 18 
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The first two equations define taxable income for working and for retired households.
19 The last 
two equations show the evolution of resources available for consumption. In these constraints  j e  
denotes labor earnings at age j.  () SS ⋅  are social security benefits, which are a function of 
aggregate lifetime earnings, and  () DB ⋅  are defined benefit receipts, which are a function of 
earnings received at the last working age. The functions () T ⋅  and () R T ⋅  denote means-tested 
transfers for working and retired households. Transfers depend on earnings, social security 
benefits and defined benefit pensions, assets, the year, and the number of children and adults in 
the household, n. Medical expenditures are denoted by  j m  and the interest rate is denoted 
byr .
20 The tax function () τ ⋅ depicts total tax payments as a function of earned and capital income 
                                                 
18The economic environment implies a borrowing constraint in the sense that asset balances are non-negative in 
every period.  
19To define a household’s retirement date for those already retired, we use the actual retirement date for the head of 
the household. For those not retired, we use the expected retirement date of the person who is the head of the 
household. 
20Medical expenses are drawn from the Markov processes  1 (| ) jm j j mm + Ω  for married and  1 (| ) js j j mm + Ω  for 
single households.  Medical expenses drawn from the distribution for single households are assumed to be half of 
those drawn from the distribution for married couples.  
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for working households, and as a function of pension and capital income plus a portion of social 
security benefits for retired households.
21  
  We simplify the problem by assuming households incur no out-of-pocket medical expenses 
prior to retirement and face no pre-retirement mortality risk. Therefore, the dynamic 
programming problem for working households has two fewer state variables than it does for 
retired households.  During working years, the earnings draw for the next period comes from the 
distribution Φ conditional on the household’s age and current earnings draw.  We assume that 
each household begins life with zero assets. 
III.1. Model Parameterization 
  We briefly discuss several key modeling decisions.  Details for survival probabilities, the 
tax function, and medical expenses are given in Appendix 2.  Further discussion and sensitivity 
analyses are given in Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006). 
  We use constant relative risk-averse preferences, so 
1










 We set the 
discount factor as  0.96 β =  and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (the reciprocal of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution) to  3. γ =   We assume an annualized real rate of return of 
4 percent.  
  Our equivalence scale comes from Citro and Michael (1995) and takes the form 
0.7 (, )( 0 . 7) jj j j gA K A K =+ , where  j A  indicates the number of adults (children) in the household 
and  j K  indicates the number of children in the household. This scale implies that a two parent 
                                                 
21Specifically, taxable social security benefits for single taxpayers are calculated from the expression 
max(0,min(0.5*  ,  0.5*   25,000)) SS Benefits Income SS Benefits −− . Taxable benefits for married couples are 
calculated similarly, but replacing 25,000 with 32,000. This approach approximates the law in effect in 1992.   13
family with 3 children consumes 66 percent more than a two parent family with no children. 
There are other equivalence scales, including ones from the OECD (1982), Department of Health 
and Human Services (Federal Register, 1991) and Lazear and Michael (1980).  The 
corresponding numbers for these equivalence scales is 88 percent, 76 percent and 59 percent. 
Our scale lies in between these values.  
  One of the purposes of the paper is to contrast the effects of children on wealth with the 
effects of asset-tested transfer payments.  To do this we model the benefits from public income 
transfer programs using a specification suggested by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995). The 
transfer that a household receives while working is given by 
[ ] { } max 0, (1 ) , Tc e r a =− + +  
whereas the transfer that the household will receive upon retiring is 
  [ ] { } max 0, ( ) ( ) (1 ) . RR R Tc S S E D B e r a =− + + +  
This transfer function guarantees a pre-tax income of c, which we set based on parameters 
drawn from Moffitt (2002).
22 Subsistence benefits (c) for a one-parent family with two children 
increased sharply, from $5,992 in 1968 to $9,887 in 1974 (all in 1992 dollars). Benefits have 
trended down from their 1974 peak—in 1992 the consumption floor was $8,159 for the one-
parent, two-child family. We assume through this formulation that earnings, retirement income, 
and assets reduce public benefits dollar for dollar.  
                                                 
22The c in the model reflects the consumption floor that is the result of all transfers (including, for example, SSI). 
Moffitt (2002, http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Moffitt/DataSets.html) provides a consistent series for average 
benefits received by a family of four. To proxy for the effects of all transfer programs we use his “modified real 
benefit sum” variable, which roughly accounts for the cash value of food stamp, AFDC, and Medicaid guarantees. 
We weight state-level benefits by population to calculate an average national income floor. We use 1960 values for 
years prior to 1960 and use the equivalence scale described above to adjust benefits for families with different 
configurations of adults and children. We confirm that the equivalence scale adjustments closely match average  
  14
  We aggregate individual earnings histories into household earnings histories. Earnings 
expectations are a central influence on life-cycle consumption decisions, both directly and 
through their effects on expected pension and social security benefits. The household model of 




jj j j eA G E A G E u αβ β = +++ , 
1 , jj j uu ρ ε − = +  
where  j e  is the observed earnings of the household i at age j in 1992-dollars, 
i α  is a household 
specific constant, AGEj is age of the head of the household,  j u  is an AR(1) error term of the 
earnings equation, and  j ε  is a zero-mean i.i.d., normally distributed error term. The estimated 
parameters are
i α ,  1 β ,  2 β , ρ, and  ε σ . 
  We divide households into six groups according to marital status, education, and number of 
earners in the household, giving us six sets of household-group-specific parameters.
23 Estimates 
of the persistence parameters range from 0.58 for single households without college degrees to 
0.76 for married households with two earners, in which the highest earner has at least a college 
degree. The variance of earnings shocks ranges from 0.08 for married households with either one 
or two earners and in which the highest earner has at least a college degree, to 0.21 for single 
households without college degrees (Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006, give more details).  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
benefit patterns for families with different numbers of adults and children using data from the Green Book (1983, 
pp. 259–260, 301–302; 1988, pp. 410–412, 789). 
23The six groups are (1) single without a college degree; (2) single with a college degree or more; (3) married, head 
without a college degree, one earner; (4) married, head without a college degree, two earners; (5) married, head with 
a college degree, one earner; and (6) married, head with a college degree, two earners. A respondent is an earner if 
his or her lifetime earnings are positive and contribute at least 20 percent of the lifetime earnings of the household.   15
III.2. Model  Solution 
  We solve the dynamic programming problem by linear interpolation on the value function.  
For each household in our sample we compute optimal decision rules for consumption (and 
hence asset accumulation) from the oldest possible age (D) to the beginning of working life (S ) 
for any feasible realizations of the random variables: earnings, health shocks, and mortality. 
These decision rules differ for each household, since each faces stochastic draws from different 
earnings distributions (recall that  i α  is household specific). Household-specific earnings 
expectations also directly influence expectations about social security and pension benefits. 
Other characteristics also differ across households: for example, birth years of children affect the 
scale economies of a household at any given age (as determined by the equivalence scale). 
Consequently, it is not sufficient to solve the life-cycle problem for just a few household types. 
III.3.  Policy Experiments and Results 
  A key feature of our analysis is that we compute optimal decision rules for each household 
in the HRS.  Using the optimal rules, households’ actual earnings draws, and the rate of return 
assumption we obtain household-level predictions for wealth. Using the model and household 
data, we can incorporate the specific variation in both the number and timing of kids that we see 
in the HRS.  It also allows us to conduct counterfactual policy experiments where we can alter 
features of the economic environment to better understand the effect that children have on wealth 
accumulation.   
  The baseline results presented in Table 3 are discussed in Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun 
(2006).  Here we discuss other features of the results.  The model generates a distribution of 
optimal wealth that matches (in fact it slightly exceeds) the skewness of the actual wealth 
distribution (so, for example, we do not need to rely on bequest motives to replicate the  
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distribution of wealth).  The 90-25 ratio of unweighted net worth in the data is 20.7.  In the 
simulated optimal wealth data it is 28.5 (we cannot compute the 90-10 ratio, since optimal 
wealth in the 10
th decile is $0).  The coefficient of variation in the actual data is 2.1, in the 
simulated data it is 2.4.  For ease of exposition when discussing our remaining results, we 
present data on median wealth that arises in the counterfactual environment with median optimal 
wealth in the baseline model.  The qualitative results and conclusions are the same when using 
mean wealth levels as the benchmark (details are available on request). 
  The model also captures the gradient in median wealth by number of children – simulated 
optimal net worth increases as the number of children increases from 0 to 2 and declines 
monotonically thereafter – mirroring the pattern seen in the data.  This pattern is partly a 
reflection of the earnings profiles shown in Figure 2, where lifetime earnings increase across 
households with 0, 1, and 2 children and then falls for households with more than 2 children.  
But as described below, the pattern is also a consequence of interactions between consumption, 
children, and wealth accumulation. 
III.3.1.The Effect of the Number and Timing of Children 
  Our first experiment highlights the effects that heterogeneity in both the number and timing 
of children has on wealth.  We assign each married couple the mean number of children (for all 
married couples), assuming they are born at the median age of married couples that have four 
children.  Specifically, married couples are assumed to have 3.6 children, born at ages (of the 
head of household) of 23, 26, 29, and the 0.6 child at age 33.  Similarly, all single households 
have 2.8 children, born at the ages of 23, 26, and the 0.8 child at age 29.  Allowing households to 
have “fractional” children ensures that the aggregate number of children in the simulated   17
economy matches the number of children born to HRS households.  This consistency is essential 
if children, in fact, are shown to have an important effect on wealth. 
  As can be seen from Table 4, the effect of altering the timing and number of children is 
substantial. When the lowest income decile households have 3.6 children at the timing of the 
median 4-child household instead of 4.6 children at different times in the lifecycle, median 
optimal net worth increases from $1,350 to $16,403.
24 Children have two related effects.  First, 
by having fewer children in the counterfactual simulations than they do in the data, child-
oriented expenditures (and aggregate expenditures) are smaller and their retirement wealth is 
larger than it would be if they had more children.  Second, children affect the length of time 
households will be credit constrained.  The second and fourth columns of Table 4 report the ages 
at which the median household in each lifetime income decile is credit constrained in the 
baseline economy and in the counterfactual world where there is no variation in the number (and 
timing) of children. In the baseline economy, the median household in the lowest lifetime income 
decile is credit constrained until age 34.  This figure drops to age 26 when there is no variation in 
the number of children. The timing and number of children has a substantial effect on when the 
household begins saving for retirement.  
  The systematic variation of kids by lifetime income can be thought of as increasing the 
dispersion in earnings.  Low lifetime income households have, on average, more children than do 
high lifetime income households.  Therefore, the effective income available to the household 
after adjusting for family size (through the equivalence scale) falls by more for low-income 
households than it does for high-income households.  Thus, fertility differences make the 
resources available for consumption even more dispersed than the distribution of earnings.  
                                                 
24 Mean optimal asset holdings increase to $63,472 from $38,537.  
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Hence asset variation decreases when we shut down the variation in the number and timing of 
kids. Indeed the coefficient of variation of optimal net worth drops from 2.4 in the baseline 
optimal net worth distribution to 1.7 when the variation in children is shut down.  
III.3.2.The Effect of the Timing of Children 
  To study the effect of the timing of children, we allow each household to have the number 
of children that it actually has, but assume that all families with one child have the child at age 
29 (the median age of birth for one-child families), all two-child families have their children at 
ages 26 and 30, and so on.
25   
  Timing should matter for the following reason.  Since children's consumption depends on 
their parent's consumption and since income increases with age, having children later on in life 
will mean more expenditures on children. Families that have children later in their life-cycle will, 
all else equal, have fewer resources at retirement. Thus, shutting down this variation, should lead 
to a smaller dispersion in wealth. 
  The results of eliminating variation in the timing of children are shown in the second 
column of Table 5.  When there is no variation in the timing of births, wealth doubles in the 
lowest decile and increases 40 percent in the second lifetime income decile. While these 
percentage changes seem substantial, the dollar changes are much smaller than the combined 
effect of altering both the number and timing of children.  Therefore, the bulk of the variation in 
wealth is caused by the variation in family size across households with different lifetime 
incomes. 
 
                                                 
25 Ages for 3-child families are 24, 27, 31; 4-child families are 23, 26, 29, 33; 5-child families are 22, 25, 27, 30, 34; 
6-child families are 22, 24, 26, 28, 31, 35; and 7-child families are 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 36.   19
III.3.3. The Effect of Heterogeneity in Earnings  
  It is difficult to assess exactly how large the effects of children are on wealth accumulation 
absent alternative counterfactual reference points.  In this subsection we perform an experiment 
where we shut down household heterogeneity in earnings processes. Recall that we assume that 
earnings processes have a household specific component that governs the slope of the earnings 
profile. More educated households, for instance, have higher intercepts and steeper slopes of 
their expected age-earnings profiles than do less well educated households.  Earnings 
expectations, of course, affect wealth accumulation.  
  Shutting down this source of heterogeneity would lead every household to draw its earnings 
shocks from a distribution with the same slope of the earnings profile. For instance, a college 
graduate would (incorrectly) assume that she would experience the same growth rate in earnings 
as would a high school graduate. This would lead the college graduate to accumulate less wealth 
(in all states of the world relative to the case in which she has a higher alpha) since the graduate 
would expect a lower future income. To be clear, a graduate who is now assigned a smaller slope 
coefficient is pleasantly surprised (on average) when she receives her earnings draws. However, 
she correctly recognizes that the persistence of the shock is high. Relative to the ‘truth’ wherein 
the slope is higher, her expectation of future income is lower. The lower expectation of future 
income leads her to accumulate less for retirement than in the case in which she is assigned a 
higher alpha to begin. Table 5 reports the results. Notice that the dispersion in wealth is smaller 
than in the baseline case. The noteworthy feature of the results is that the effect of earnings 




III.3.4.The Effect of Transfer Programs 
  Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) argue that households with low earnings have little 
wealth (as a percentage of lifetime income) because asset tests associated with means-tested 
transfer programs discourage saving.  Recall, c denotes the generosity of the transfer program.  
To study their effects we set c to zero, but assume that there exists a governmental program that 
insures individuals against out of pocket medical shocks. Thus our experiment effectively 
eliminates cash and near-cash transfers. The last column of Table 5 reports the results.  Cash and 
near-cash transfer programs have very little effect on asset accumulation – the median net worth 
in the lowest decile increases from $1,350 to $1,483 when the consumption floor is set to zero.
26 
  The structure, benefits, and receipt of transfers modeled in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 
and in our paper are very similar. They model a consumption floor of $7,000 in 1984 dollars. 
Our floor in 1984 (based on data provided by Moffitt) is roughly $6,300 dollars.
27 In 1980, when 
the average HRS respondent was 44 years old, 25.3 percent of households with less than a high 
school degree received transfers in our model.  Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes report that 23.7 
percent of households age 40 to 49 without a high school degree received transfers in the 1984 
PSID.  A small percentage of college graduates receive transfers in these years (0.6 percent in 
our model, 2.3 percent in the PSID). A similar close correspondence holds across education 
groups for households in 1990. 
  The negligible effect of the transfer program arises due to two key differences in our work 
relative to Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes.  First, poorer households by virtue of their larger family 
                                                 
26 In a recent careful study, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) find little effect on wealth accumulation from state-level 
changes in asset tests associated with the 1996 welfare reform.  
27 Our floor, of course, varies by year and by family composition.     21
size, optimally plan on having fewer resources for retirement, when their children will have left 
the household.  Second, these households are credit constrained for a longer period of time and 
hence begin asset accumulation later on in life. This depresses wealth accumulation.  
  To summarize, the presence of children in the household (along with upward sloping age-
earnings profiles) implies that low-income households are credit constrained while young, so 
they have little reason to save to smooth the discounted marginal utility of pre-retirement 
consumption.  We also find that a substantial portion of households, even in the bottom decile, 
have social security benefits exceeding the consumption floor and thereby assign a very low 
probability of using safety net programs in the future. The fact that the social security benefits 
cannot be borrowed against and that replacement rates for the poor are (almost) sufficient to 
cover their reduced consumption requirements in retirement (given that their household size is 
now much smaller) implies that there is very little disincentive effect of the transfer program on 
(already negligible) private asset accumulation. It is noteworthy that this holds despite the 
similarities in the way in which Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes and we model the social security 
system. 
  While we focus on wealth in 1992 when the average household is 55.7 years of age, the 
model also implies low wealth levels for this cohort earlier in their life-cycle. Indeed a striking 
aspect of the simulations is that the average household in the bottom decile is borrowing 
constrained until age 34, a substantially older age than for high-income households. Absent the 
demographic variation, the exact opposite holds – richer households, by virtue of their steeper 
earnings profiles, will be borrowing constrained for a longer period of time. Thus the addition of 
children into the analysis leads to the prediction that poorer households, despite their flatter 
earnings profile, will choose not to save for a substantial part of their life cycle, even when there  
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is no disincentive effects of transfer programs. Indeed in our view of the world, having 5 children 
(or the number of children observed in the HRS) alters optimal consumption choices sufficiently 
strongly to fully reconcile the low wealth holdings of the very poor with the data. 
  While we find small effects of the transfer program on wealth accumulation, our model 
implies a larger effect of transfer programs on consumption (and hence welfare) than implied by 
the Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes analysis. If transfer programs have a substantial (negative) 
effect on asset accumulation, then their effect on consumption is smaller than in a world in which 
the effect on asset accumulation is negligible. Simply put, our analysis implies that poor 
households have few assets in part due to commitments to their children. The presence of a 
transfer program increases consumption by a large magnitude, since, in the absence of the 
transfer program, they would have few resources to support consumption. In contrast, had we 
assumed that there was no variation in family size, cutting back on the transfer program would 
have increased asset accumulation, thereby leading to a smaller overall effect on consumption. 
IV. A Model with Endogenous Fertility 
  To this point, we have not offered any theory of why families have children.  Clearly, 
wealth and earnings expectations affect decisions about the number and timing of children, so 
endogenizing fertility is necessary to examine the robustness of the previous results.  When 
writing a model of endogenous fertility we want to account for the joint distribution of wealth 
and fertility – a much more stringent test than simply matching wealth.  To do this, we follow the 
pioneering work of Becker and Barro (1988) and assume that parents get utility from the quantity 
and the quality of their children. We do not model the timing of children, and instead assume that   23
parents give birth to all their children at age B > S.  Children are then in the household for 18 
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Specifically, parents care about the number of children, f, and utility per child,  ()
k
j Uc , while the 
child lives in the household. The function b(f) denotes the weight that parents place on quantity. 
Following Barro and Becker, we assume that b(f) is increasing and concave. We also assume that 
children entail a cost. The budget constraint during the period of time when the kids are attached 
to parents is given by 
( ) { } 1 , ,..., 17 ,
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Notice that the only change from the previous model is that each child requires the fraction κ  of 
the parent’s earnings, over and above direct consumption needs. This captures the indirect time 
costs associated with bearing and rearing children. The presence of this fixed cost will imply that 
higher  j e households will have fewer children than their lower  j e counterparts. 
  The decision problem now entails two more choice variables – the fertility rate,  , f  and 
consumption per child, 
k
j c . The first order conditions with respect to 
k
j c  and  f  are given by 
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In the above equation,  1() B V + i  stands for the value function at age B+1. We continue to assume 
that the utility function is of the CRRA variety but assume that 
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restriction that γ  lies between 0 and 1 is designed to ensure that utility is always a positive 
number.
28 We assume that the discount factor function is given by 
1
01 () , 0 1 .
b bf bf b = << 
  Our model introduces four new parameters:  0 b ,  1 b , γ  and κ . The parameter κ  measures 
the time cost of children. According to Haveman and Wolfe (1995) the cost per child computed 
as the reduction in the mother’s time spent in the paid labor force valued at the market wage is 
about 9.5 percent of parent’s earnings. Consequently we set κ  at 0.095. This leaves us with three 
parameters we need to set:  0 b , 1 b and γ . 
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γ γ + +=+  To make sure that the structure of preferences is similar to the 
structure that we used in the exogenous fertility version of the model, the condition  
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must be satisfied.  This condition ensures that the equivalence scale is (approximately) an 
equilibrium implication of the endogenous fertility model. This condition together with the 
requirement that we match the fertility rate for the median family pins down the remaining   25
parameters.
29 The resulting parameter values are  0 0.66 b = ,  1 0.57 b =  and  0.61 γ = . These 
parameters lie within the range of values in the fertility literature (see for instance Doepke, 
2004). 
  With the parameters specified, we are now in a position to examine the implications of the 
endogenous fertility model. As in the baseline case, we solve the model household-by-household 
and report the predictions by deciles of lifetime income in Table 6.
30  The model matches the 
wide variation in fertility rates strikingly well. The predictions for wealth (in levels) are also 
shown in Table 6 – again the model is reasonably successful in accounting for the wide variation 
in wealth.  
  We are now in a position to analyze the effects of transfer programs on fertility and wealth. 
To do this we again shut down cash and near-cash transfer programs. In Table 6 we see that the 
fertility rate of the poorest households decrease slightly and the simulated optimal net worth 
increases slightly.  What happens is that as transfer incomes are eliminated, the household cuts 
down on the number of children. The reduction in income resulting from eliminating transfer 
programs leads the household to cut back on consumption, children’s consumption and the 
number of children. The corresponding increase in wealth is due to two reasons.  First, holding 
fertility fixed, the household wants to increase its wealth to provide insurance, which it 
previously received through the transfer program.  This effect arises in the exogenous fertility 
model, but it is small. Second, eliminating the transfer program reduces the fertility rate of 
program recipients. Since the change in the fertility rate is small, this also has a small effect on 
wealth accumulation, hence the overall effect is also small. 
                                                                                                                                                             
28 An alternative is to keep the value ofγ  at 3 but to add a constant B to the utility function. The constant needs to 
be high enough to ensure that utility is always positive.  This approach yields very similar quantitative results.  
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  We draw two conclusions from the endogenous fertility model. First, the endogenous 
fertility model is able to capture the joint distribution of fertility and wealth strikingly well. 
Second, the transfer program does not have a large effect on wealth accumulation even after 
accounting for an economic explanation for why families have children.   
V.  HRS Data 
  The models we analyze suggest that children are a significant determinant of wealth 
accumulation.  A natural question to ask is whether these patterns are observable in the HRS 
data.  Table 7 presents one reduced form median regression specification showing the correlation 
of children and net worth.
31  The sample is restricted to married couples and excludes the self-
employed and includes the combined annual earnings of both partners between the ages 22 and 
the age of the household head in 1991.  It is clear, relative to the baseline childless household, 
that families with children have less net worth.  The patterns by parity are uneven:  like Figure 1, 
the gradient is generally declining with the number of children for families with 2 to 7 children, 
though the differences across adjacent parities are generally not statistically significant.  The 
sharpest difference appears for one-child families. 
  Instead of the Becker-Barro motivation for children, readers might wonder whether parents, 
particularly with low lifetime incomes, have children as an investment with the expectation that 
children might support them in old age.  There is little evidence for that in the United States.  
Gale and Scholz (1994) review the older evidence showing relatively minor transfer flows from 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 By construction, we match the fertility rate of only the median household. 
30 In Table 6 we restrict the sample to only married couples.   
31 The OLS estimates are -$68,624 for one-child families, -$74,259 for 2-child families, -$93,105 for 3-child 
families, -$72,553 for 4-child families, -$99,810 for 5-child families, -$103,418 for 6-child families, and -$111,705 
for families with 7 or more children.   27
children to parents in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.  The HRS data corroborate 
these results.   
VI.  Conclusions  
  A large number of potential explanations for wealth dispersion have been proposed in the 
literature.  Some argue that the life-cycle model with uncertainty must be augmented with a 
bequest motive to match the observed skewness of the wealth distribution. Others suggest that 
the poor have higher discount rates than richer households. While there has been a lot of 
attention paid to variation in discount factors and bequest motives, we find it surprising that very 
little attention has been paid to examining the effect that children have on wealth accumulation.  
  We study the effect of children in the context of a life-cycle model with uninsurable income 
risks and borrowing constraints, as well as a variant of the same model with endogenous fertility. 
Our study yields two conclusions – first, the variation in family size plays a very important role 
in understanding the wide dispersion in wealth. Second, once variations in family size are 
accounted for, means-tested cash and near-cash transfer programs have very little effect on 
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Table 1:  Variation in Age of Last Birth, Earnings, and Net Worth by Number of Children, 
Weighted HRS Data 































$87,471 $213,720 $1,038,604 
1 8.8  28.9  83.8  95,500  206,911  1,255,927 
2 24.9  30.5  82.6  144,500 272,842  1,528,333 
3 22.5  31.7  79.4  127,000 265,723  1,472,372 
4 9.3  33.1  76.0  98,000  207,173  1,335,529 
5 9.0  33.9  73.4  93,269  199,081  1,272,693 
6 6.4  35.0  70.6  62,000  161,280  1,172,262 
7 or more  9.9  37.1  67.6  51,923  143,543  1,083,206 
Full 
Population 
100.0 32.4  77.7  102,600 225,928  1,338,754 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Health and Retirement Study data, as described in the text.   31
 
 
Table 2:  Variation in Net Worth, Fertility and Earnings by Lifetime Earnings Deciles, Weighted  










Mean Age of Head   Mean %age of 
Earnings 
Decile /1  Net Worth  Net 
Worth 
of Children  When Last Child is 
Born 
After Last Child is 
Born 
Lowest $35,450  $111,991  4.6  35.3  69.1 
2 65,600  166,974  4.1  33.4  74.2 
3 90,962  171,847  3.9  32.7  77.3 
4 114,000  199,800  3.5  32.5  77.9 
Middle 124,348  238,961 3.7  32.3  78.2 
6 136,672  214,699  3.6  32.4  78.3 
7 184,000  286,538  3.3  32.1  79.0 
8 206,253  330,984  3.3  32.7  79.0 
9 266,800  451,280  3.3  32.4  80.3 
Highest 433,326  687,277 3.1  33.3  82.1 
All Married 
Couples 
142,885 280,549  3.7  32.9  77.4 










Mean Age of Head   Mean %age of 
Earnings 
Decile /1  Net Worth  Net 
Worth 
of Children  When Last Child is 
Born /2 
After Last Child is 
Born 
Lowest $1,000  $83,556  4.4  31.5  65.6 
2 4,942  42,252  3.5  31.2  71.4 
3 9,600  46,481  3.5  31.4  75.0 
4 14,423  63,616  3.1  30.1  83.8 
Middle 32,020  84,142 3.0  30.3  82.2 
6 35,000  81,134  2.7  30.2  82.1 
7 59,950  135,709  2.5  30.7  81.0 
8 91,347  164,248  2.3  30.8  82.3 
9 86,500  188,393  2.0  31.8  79.5 
Highest 129,808  315,067 2.1  32.7  78.3 
All Singles  39,000  121,682  2.8  31.0  78.4 
          
Notes          
/1 Earnings deciles are defined separately for married couples and singles  
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Table 3:  Actual and Optimal Median and Mean Net Worth, Unweighted HRS Data 









Mean Optimal  
Net Worth 
Lowest $2,885  $1,350  $44,872  $38,537 
2 21,050  10,749  73,767  56,447 
3 37,750  24,281  97,291  67,629 
4 61,565  36,539  142,990  103,014 
Middle 80,938  45,733  162,037  110,753 
6 99,300  63,639  179,298  120,961 
7 118,462  74,250  212,584  143,187 
8 157,000  93,618  254,822  172,105 
9 213,000  127,082  329,334  220,750 
Highest 353,500  221,434  639,505  433,869 
Full Population  88,200  52,889  204,109  139,071 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Health and Retirement Study data, as described in the text. 
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Table 4:  The Effects of Eliminating Variation in the Number and Timing of Children 
  Baseline  No Variation in kids 










Lowest $1,350  34 $16,403 26 
2  10,749 32 27,584 27 
3  24,281 31 31,475 27 
4  36,539 29 38,576 28 
5  45,733 28 45,638 28 
6  63,639 27 64,372 29 
7  74,250 27 67,463 30 
8  93,618 29 87,394 31 
9  127,082 30 115,394 31 
Highest  221,434 32 180,463 34 





Table 5:  Effect of Altering the Timing of Children, Earnings, and The Transfer System on 
Median Optimal Net Worth, HRS Data 
  Median Optimal Net Worth 










Lowest $1,350  $2,674  $14,356  $1,483 
2 10,749  14,563  25,674  11,302 
3 24,281  27,946  32,564  25,056 
4 36,539  37,956  39,561  36,897 
5 45,733  46,475  45,637  46,088 
6 63,639  62,197  64,573  63,858 
7 74,250  72,183  66,674  74,382 
8 93,618  91,364  80,675  93,656 
9 127,082  122,362  110,263  127,131 
Highest 221,434  210,573  170,483  221,437 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Health and Retirement Study data, as described in the text.   35
 
Table 6:  Results on Fertility and Net Worth for a Model with Endogenous Fertility, 

























Lowest  $20,714 4.6  4.5 $26,221 4.3 
2  38,254 4.1  4.2 41,573 4.1 
3  53,894 3.9  4.0 54,903 4.0 
4  71,996 3.5  3.7 72,035 3.7 
5  74,718 3.7  3.5 74,734 3.5 
6  79,159 3.6  3.4 79,163 3.4 
7  111,280 3.3  3.3 111,282 3.3 
8  134,092 3.3  3.3 134,092 3.3 
9  153,326 3.3  3.3 153,326 3.1 
Highest  270,442 3.1  3.2 270,442 3.0 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Health and Retirement Study data, as described in the text. 
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Table 7:  Median Regression Estimates of Household Net Worth: 
The Sample Is Restricted to Married, Non-Self-Employed Couples 
   Coefficients  Standard Errors  T-Statistics 
High School Graduate  23,934.3  4,987.9  4.80 
College Graduate  74,515.0  12,142.2  6.14 
Post-College Education  103,614.4  22,899.2  4.52 
Age 2,359.3  727.5  3.24 
Do You Hold a DB Pension  5,169.8  3,610.7  1.43 
1 Child  -62,871.0  13,090.1  -4.80 
2 Children  -36,207.0  13,087.3  -2.77 
3 Children  -48,026.9  14,135.1  -3.40 
4 Children  -51,591.0  19,202.3  -2.69 
5 Children  -63,353.1  14,718.2  -4.30 
6 Children  -56,888.6  26,360.6  -2.16 
7 or More Children  -68,721.7  12,311.9  -5.58 
Constant -85,025.4  48,722.8  -1.75 
      
Notes:  The regressions include annual earnings for households between ages 22 to 65. 
      Figure 1:  Net Worth in 1992 as a Percentage of Summed,






























































































Source:  HRS and restricted access social security earnings data and authors' calculations.
Figure 2:  Median Age-Log Earnings Profiles by Family Size  37
 
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Health and Retirement Study 
(dollar amounts in 1992 dollars) 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Present Discounted Value 
of Lifetime Earnings  $1,718,932 $1,541,555 $1,207,561 
Defined Benefit Pension 
Wealth  $106,041 $17,327 $191,407 
Social Security Wealth  $107,577  $97,726  $65,397 
Net Worth  $225,928  $102,600  $464,314 
Mean Age (years)  55.7  4.7 
Mean Education (years)  12.7  3.4 
Fraction Male  0.70  0.46 
Fraction Black  0.11  0.31 
Fraction Hispanic  0.06  0.25 
Fraction Couple  0.66  0.48 
No High School Diploma  0.22  0.41 
High School Diploma  0.55  0.50 
College Graduate  0.12  0.33 
Post-College Education  0.10  0.30 
Fraction Self-Employed  0.15  0.35 
Fraction Partially or 
Fully Retired  0.29 0.45 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1992 HRS. The table is weighted by the 1992 




Appendix 1:  Earnings 
 
  Two issues arise in using earnings information.  First, social security earnings records are 
not available for 22.8 percent of the respondents included in the analysis.  Second, the social 
security earnings records are top-coded (households earn more than the social security taxable 
wage caps) for 16 percent of earnings observations between 1951 and 1979.  From 1980 through 
1991 censoring is much less of an issue, because we have access to W-2 earnings records, which 
are very rarely censored.   
We impute earnings histories for those individuals with missing or top-coded earnings 
records assuming the individual log-earnings process  
       0 , 0 0 ,
*
0 , i i i x y ε β + ′ =  




, T t x y y t i t i t i t i ∈ + ′ + = − ε β ρ    (1) 
       t i i t i u , , + =α ε          
where 
*
, it y  is the log of latent earnings of the individual i at time t in 1992 dollars, xi,t  is the 
vector of i's characteristics at time t, and the error term εi,t  includes an individual-specific 
component  i α , which is constant over time, and an unanticipated white noise component, ui,t . 
We employ random-effect assumptions with homoskedastic errors to estimate equation (1). 
  We estimate the model separately for four groups:  men without a college degree, men with 
a college degree, women without a college degree, and women with a college degree.  In Scholz, 
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) we give details of the empirical earnings model, coefficient 
estimates from that model, and describe our Gibbs sampling procedure that we use to impute 
earnings for individuals who refuse to release or who have top-coded social security earnings 
histories. Our approach is appealing in that it uses information from the entire sequence of 
individual earnings, including are uncensored W-2 data from 1980-1991, to impute missing and 
top-coded earnings. 
 
Appendix 2:  Additional Model Parameters 
 Survival  Probabilities: These are based on the 1992 life tables of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life92_2.pdf). 
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where y is in thousands of dollars. Parameters are estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994, 
1999), and characterize U.S. effective, average household income taxes between 1966 and 
1989.
32 We use the 1966 parameters for years before 1966 and the 1989 parameters for 1990 and 
1991.  
                                                 
32Estimated parameters, for example, in 1989 are  0 0.258 a = ,  1 0.768 a =  and  2 0.031 a = . In the 
framework, 1 1 a =−  corresponds to a lump sum tax with  02 () ya a τ = − , while when  1 0 a → , the tax system 
converges to a proportional tax system with  0 () ya y τ = . For  1 0 a >  we have a progressive tax system.   39
  Out of Pocket Medical Expenses: The specification for household medical expense profiles 
for retired households is given by 
   
2
01 2 log , tt t t mA G E A G E u ββ β = ++ +  
    
2
1 ,~ ( 0 ,) , tt t t uu Nε ρ εε σ − =+  
where mt is the household's out-of-pocket medical expenses at time t (the medical expenses are 
assumed to be $1 if the self-report is zero or if the household has not yet retired), AGEt is age of 
the household head at time t, ut is an AR(1) error term and εt is white-noise. The parameters to be 
estimated are β0, β1, β2, ρ, and σε.  
  We estimate the medical-expense specification for four groups of households: (1) single 
without a college degree, (2) single with a college degree, (3) married without a college degree, 
and (4) married with a college degree, using the 1998 and 2000 waves of the HRS, which 
provide medical expense information on households age 27 to 106.
33 We use the age and 
education of the head of household in the empirical model. Results are given in the third section 
of the Appendix. The persistence parameters for medical shocks cluster tightly between 0.84 and 
0.86 across groups. The variance of shocks is lower for households with greater education within 
a given household type (married or single), presumably reflecting higher rates of insurance 
coverage for households with college degrees relative to others. 
 
 
                                                 
33Older cohorts from the AHEAD and two new cohorts were added to the HRS in 1998, which gives us a broader 
range of ages to estimate medical expense profiles after retirement. These new cohorts were not matched to their 
social security earnings records, so they cannot be used for our baseline analysis. 